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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY,
a division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corporaPlaintiff,
tion,

Case No.
8951

vs.
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS,
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRESTON, partners, doing business under
the firm name of DAVIS OIL COMPANY,
Defendants and Respondents. i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will sometimes be designated in this brief
as follows: Plaintiff and appellant, Stanton Transportation Company, as "Stanton," plaintiff, Continental Emsco
Company, a division of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, as "Emsco," and defendants and respondents, Marvin
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Davis, Jack Davis, Jean Davis and Joan Preston, partner,
doing business under the firm name of Davis Oil Compan;
as "Davis."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a very narrow question. The prol
lem is simply whether the trial court erred in ruling th~
Stanton was not entitled to a mechanic's lien under tb
Utah mechanics' lien statute for work performed in tram
porting an oil well drilling rig to a drilling site where 1
was used to drill an oil well.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no serious dispute as to the facts related t
the issue presented on this appeal. The trial court helm
found upon all of the essential facts, which findings ar
not here objected to by Davis. Record references will therE
fore for the most part be to the findings of the court bE
low. References to the clerk's files will be designated a
"R." and to the transcript of the evidence of the hearin
on September 20, 1957, as "T.R.A." and to the transcrii
of the evidence of the hearing on November 5 and 6, 195'
as "T.R.B."
Stanton Transportation Company is a corporation 01
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of Colt
rado and authorized to do business in the State of Utah~
a common carrier of equipment and supplies used in drilliiJ
oil and gas wells (R. 78). The Davis Oil Company is
partnership consisting of Marvin Davis, Jack Davis, Jea
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Davis and Joan Preston, which is engaged in the business of
drilling oil and gas wells and related activities. Davis was at
all times herein material the owner of an oil and gas lease
covering the following described property in San Juan
County, State of Utah:
"The Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of Section 27, Township 41 South, Range 24
East of the Salt Lake Meridian."
On December 19, 1956, Davis entered into a contract
with Walker-Wilson Drilling Company, oil and gas drilling
contractors, whereby Walker-Wilson agreed to drill an oil
and gas well for Davis on the premises covered by the oil
and gas lease referred to above (R. 78). At the time the
parties entered into this contract, it was contemplated that
the drilling rig was to be on the new location and ready
to drill on or before December 25, 1956. The drilling rig
which was to be used had been dismantled and stacked at
a former drilling site located approximately 36 miles southeast of Hayden, Colorado. In order to reach the location
where the rig had been stacked, it was necessary to travel
over 30 miles on unimproved roads and there was several
feet of snow on the ground where the rig had been stacked.
The total distance from the old site to the new site was
496 miles. In order to reach the new site it was necessary
to travel over another 42 miles of unimproved roads and
ford the San Juan River. Some of the individual items
which had to be transported weighed as much as 40,300
pounds (R. 79). Both Davis and Walker-Wilson knew that
in order to drill the oil and gas well it would be necessary to
obtain specially designed cranes and trucks to transport the
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drilling rig to the new site and to assist in erecting the
drilling equipment thereon. Their contract specifically provided that Walker-Wilson was to obtain the necessary equipment and that Davis was to pay for the cost of transporting
the drilling rig to the new site and erecting it thereon (R.
78, 79).
Because of the tremendous weights involved and the
extremely rough terrain which had to be traversed, it was
necessary to use specially designed trucks and equipment
and men specially trained in the transporting of oil well
drilling equipment. Stanton owns equipment designed to
make such moves and employs men who are trained in this
type of work (R. 79). It has been engaged in the business
of transporting such equipment in the intermountain area
since 1926 (T.R.A. 7).
Walker-Wilson entered into a contract with Stanton
whereby Stanton agreed to move the drilling rig and other
equipment necessary to drill the oil well from the old site
to the new site and to assist in erecting the drilling rig and
preparing the new site so that an oil well could be drilled
thereon. Pursuant to said agreement, Stanton transported
the drilling rig from the old site to the new location. In
so doing, Stanton used 23 trucks and approximately 30 men.
In order to erect the drilling rig and prepare the drilling
site so that an oil well could be drilled thereon, it is necessary to use winches, cranes and other special equipment
such as that owned by Stanton. Before the drilling equipment could be loaded at the old location, in many cases it
was necessary to use winches and cranes to break the equipment loose from the frozen ground. After they reached the
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5
drilling site, Stanton's men and equipment were used to
erect the superstructure, to lift draw works to the drilling
floor, install mud tanks and do other work in preparing the
drilling rig and equipment so that it could be used to drill
an oil well. Without Stanton's men and equipment it would
have been impossible to have erected the drilling rig or to
have drilled an oil well on the Davis lease (R. 79, 80).
All of the equipment had been moved to the new site,
the drilling rig had been erected and was ready to start
drilling on December 25, 1956. The drilling rig was used
in drilling an oil well which was completed as a producer
on or about February 27, 1958, on premises described above
(R. 18, 80, T.R.B. 21).
The value of work and labor performed and services
rendered by Stanton in moving the drilling rig and other
equipment to the new site was $10,984.64. The value of
work and labor performed and services rendered by Stanton in erecting the drilling rig and preparing the site for
drilling was $1,244.50. These charges are fair and reasonable for the work and labor performed and the services
rendered and are made in accordance with Stanton's tariffs which are on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Walker-Wilson was billed for said amounts but all
attempts to collect said charges have failed and the full
amount is now due and owing (R. 80).
The contract between Davis and Walker-Wilson involved more than $500.00 but Davis did not obtain a bond
for the protection of mechanics and materialmen from
Walker-Wilson in accordance with the provisions of Section
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (T.R.A. 4).
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Stanton filed a notice of lien for the above stated
amounts with the County Recorder of San Juan County on
March 12, 1957, and commenced action on June 26, 1957,
to foreclose its mechanic's lien andjor to obtain a personal
judgment against the respondents for the amount of its
claims pursuant to the provisions of Section 14-2-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 (R. 1-4). Stanton caused notice to
be published to lien claimants and Continental-Emsco Company, a division of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company, appeared, presented its lien claim and was made a
party plaintiff. Continental-Emsco obtained a judgment
against Davis, from which Davis has appealed and which
has been consolidated with Stanton's appeal for the convenience of the court. No further discussion of the Davis
appeal and the problems related to Continental-Emsco will
be mentioned in this brief.
On September 13, 1957, Stanton entered into a stipulation with Davis whereby Stanton released its lien claim
which was the subject matter of the action with the understanding that if the trial court should adjudge and decree,
that except for said release Stanton would be entitled to
a lien upon the property of Davis and would be entitled to
foreclose said lien, and if upon the judgment becoming
final and after all appellate procedures had been exercised
or waived, Davis did not forthwith pay the principal amount
of the judgment with interest accrued thereon as determined
by the court, then judgment could be entered on Stanton's
motion in its favor against the surety named in the corporate surety bond which respondents filed with the court
(R. 26-28).
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Under the forefoing state of facts, the trial court found
that Stanton was entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value
of services rendered and labor performed in erecting the
drilling rig and preparing the site for drilling and also to
a personal judgment against the individual partners for
this amount for failure to obtain a bond from Walker-Wilson in accordance with the provisions of Section 14-2-1.
The court also found that Stanton was not entitled to
a mechanic's lien for the value of the services rendered
and work performed in transporting the drilling rig to the
new site since this did not constitute the performance of
work for the prospecting, developing, preservation or working of an oil and gas well within the meaning of the Utah
mechanics' lien statute. It is from this finding that Stanton
appeals.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
ONE WHO TRANSPORTS DRILLING EQUIPMENT TO SITE WHERE IT IS USED TO DRILL
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN FOR VALUE OF WORK PERFORMED UNDER UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN
STATUTE.
(a)

Legislative History and Wording of Statute
Support This Conclusion.

(b)

Cases From Other Jurisdictions Have Held
That Transportation is a Lienable Item
Under Mechanics' Lien Statutes Which Con-
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tain Language Much More Restrictive Than
That Contained in the Utah Statute.
(c)

Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is to be Construed Liberally to Effect Object of Statute.

(d)

Public Policy Favors the Granting of Mechanics' Liens to Persons Who Perform
Work Such as That Performed by Stanton.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
ONE WHO TRANSPORTS DRILLING EQUIPMENT TO SITE WHERE IT IS USED TO DRILL
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A MECHANIC'S LIEN FOR VALUE OF WORK PERFORMED UNDER UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN
STATUTE.
(a)

Legislative History and Wording of Statute
Support This Conclusion.

The primary question before the court on this appeal
is whether the Utah legislature in enacting Section 38-1-3,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, intended that one who renders
service or performs work in transporting oil well drilling
equipment to a site where it is used to drill an oil well is
entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work performed. This is the first time the question has been before
this court ; it is of extreme importance because of the tremendous growth of the oil and gas industry in the State of
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Utah during the past few years and the indications that it
will continue to grow in the future.
The Utah statute expressly provides that one who performs. work for the development of an oil well shall be
entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work performed. We have found no other mechanics' lien statute
which contains a provision relating to oil and gas wells as
broad as the provision which appears in the Utah statute.
Therefore, cases from other jurisdictions having different
statutes are of little help in construing the Utah statute
and we must rely to a large extent on the wording of the
statute itself and upon its legislative history in determining the legislative intent.
The statute provides as follows :
"38-1-3. Those entitled to lien-What May Be
Attached-Lien on Ores Mined.-Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing labor upon,
or furnishing materials to be used in, the construction or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, any
building, structure or improvement upon land; all
foundry men and boiler makers ; all persons performing labor or furnishing materials for the construction, repairing or carrying on of any mill, manufactory or hoisting works; all persons who shall do
work o!o furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifications, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superintendence, or who have rendered other like professional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a
lien upon the property upon or concerning whick
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they have rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials, for the value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials furnished by
each respectively, whether at the instance of the
owner or of any other person acting by his authority
as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall
attach only to such interest as the owner may have
in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a
mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of
this chaper include products mined and excavated
while the same remain upon the premises included
within the lease." (Emphasis Added.)
It would seem clear that one who performs work in transporting drilling equipment to an isolated site where it is
used to drill an oil well has performed work for the development of an oil well. This is the only reason that the
work is done and without it there can be no oil well. The
statute provides that those who have done such work shall
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which
the work was done. The legislature thereby clearly expressed its intent that the work need not actually be performed upon the property so long as it is work which concerns the development of an oil well which is drilled on
the property.

The legislative history of the statute supports the conclusion that the Utah legislature intended that persons
who perform work such as that performed by Stanton
should be protected. The Utah mechanics' lien statute has
contained substantially the same provisions since 1894.
Laws of the Territory of Utah, 1894, Chapter XLI. However, prior to 1933, there was no specific provision in the
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statute relating to oil wells. In 1933 the statute was
amended to give mechanics' liens to all persons who shall
do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine,
quarry, oil or gas well or deposit. Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933,
Section 52-1-3. Prior to 1933, the statute gave liens only
upon property upon which the parties named therein had
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials.
At the same time the statute was amended to specifically
provide for oil and gas wells, its coverage was broadened to
give liens not only upon property upon which services had
been rendered, labor performed or materials furnished but
also to give liens on property concerning which said activities had been performed. It is important to note that though
the rest of the statute remained substantially the same,
these two additions were made at the same time. The fact
that these two changes were made at the same time was no
mere coincidence. The legislature must have realized that
in the development, preservation and working of an oil and
gas well there are many activities that must be performed
such as transporting drilling equipment to isolated well
sites which might not technically be considered services
rendered or work or labor performed upon the particular
property but are certainly services rendered or work performed concerning the property and that this work is just
as essential to the development of an oil well as the work
which is performed upon the property. By inserting the
word concerning, the legislature undoubtedly intended that
the parties rendering such services or performing such
work should be protected even though the work or services
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were not actually rendered or performed upon the property.
It should also be noted that the provisions of Section

38-1-3 which give liens to those who construct, alter, add
to or repair any building, structure or improvement on
land provides that those who "perform labor upon" shall
have a lien whereas the provision pertaining to oil wells
gives a lien to all persons "who shall do work for" the prospecting, development, preservation or working of any oil
and gas well. Certainly the legislature did not intend to be
more restrictive in granting liens to those doing work for
the development or working of oil by providing that those
who "shall do work for" shall have a lien instead of limiting it only to those "who perform labor upon." On the
contrary, the provision regarding oil and gas wells is much
broader. It includes the activities covered by the term "labor
performed upon," but in addition it was intended to extend
the coverage beyond that. That this is true is evidenced by
the fact as noted above, that at the same time the legislature
amended the mechanics' liens statute to specifically provide
for oil and gas wells, it also extended the property upon
which liens could be imposed from property upon which
services had been rendered, labor performed or materials
furnished to include property conce1-ning zclzich such activities had been directed.
In this connection, the courts that have considered the
difference between the words labor and work have almost
universally held that the word work has a much more com-
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prehensive meaning than labor. The Court in State v. Rose,
125 La. 463, 51 So. 496, 497, said that:

" * * * the word 'work' has a much more
comprehensive meaning than the term 'labor' and
has been thus defined: 'to exert one's self for a
purpose, to put forth effort for the attainment of
an object; to be engaged in the performance of a
task, duty or the like.' The term as thus defined
covers all forms of physical or mental exertions, or
both combined, for the attainment of some object
other than recreation or amusement. * * *"
and the court in Silver v. Harriss, 165 La. 83, 115 So. 376,
378, stated that:

"* * * when the statute accords its benefits to all persons, natural or artificial, who may
have done any 'work' or performed any 'labor' it is
clear that it recognizes the distinction between the
terms and that the use of the former is intended to
cover a broader field of activity than the use of the
latter ; * * * "
Again, it is no coincidence that these three changes
appear together for the first time in 1933. The legislature
must have realized that in the development of an oil well
there is much work, such as transporting drilling equipment to isolated drilling locations which technically might
not be considered as labor performed upon the property.
The legislature, therefore, specifically provided that all
persons who do work for the development of an oil well
shall have a lien upon the property concerning which they
have performed the work. The statute certainly did not
restrict the lien to one who has actually performed labor
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upon the property otherwise the words "doing work for" or
"concerning which" would have no meaning.
(b)

Cases From Other Jurisdictions Have Held
That Transportation is a Lienable Item
Under Mechanics' Lien Statutes Which Contain Language Much More Restrictive Than
That Contained in the Utah Statute.

There are no cases that have considered the question
of whether work performed in transporting drilling equipment to a location where it is used to drill an oil well is
a lienable item under the Utah statute. The Utah statute
gives a lien to all persons who do work for the development
of an oil well, upon the property concerning which their
work is directed. We have found no other mechanics' lien
statute which purports to give protection to such a large
class of persons and no decisions on this question under
statutes that are even roughly similar to the Utah statute.~.
However, there are many cases where the courts have held
that those who perform work in transporting equipment or
supplies that are used in improving property are entitled
to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work performed
even though the mechanics' lien statutes involved were
much more restrictive than the Utah statute. A discussion
of the reasoning of the courts which have held that transportation is a lienable item under more restrictive statutes
may be of assistance in the instant case.
We have found cases from only two jurisdictions where
the courts have directly ruled on the question of whether
a person who performs work in transporting drilling equip-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
ment to a well site is entitled to a mechanic's lien for the
value of the work performed. The Oklahoma courts have
held that such persons are entitled to a mechanic's lien
while the Texas courts have held that they are not. Gray
v. Magdalina Oil Co., 240 S. W. 683. It should be noted,
however, that the Texas courts have held that their mechanics' lien statute is to be strictly construed. McClellen
v. Haley, 237 S. W. 627, 629. This rule of construction is
contrary to the majority rule and contrary to the rule
adopted in Utah. U. C. A. 1953, Section 68-3-2.
In Cleveland v. Hightower, 108 Okla. 84, 234 Pac. 614,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in construing a statute which
provided that:

"'* * * any person * * * who shall,
under contract express or implied, with the owner
of a leasehold for oil and gas. purposes * * *
perform any labor in constructing or putting together any machinery used in drilling * * *
shall have a lien,' * * * "
held that one who performs work in transporting pipe and
casing to an oil and gas leasehold is entitled to a mechanic's
lien under the Oklahoma statute. In so holding, the court
stated:
"* * * why should the Legislature give a
lien to the person who takes the casing when delivered upon the leasehold, screws the different
joints together, lets them down into the well, as
necessary for its operation and completion, which
casing could not be on the leasehold but for the labor
of the man who hauled it there, and at the same
time deny the same character of protection to the
laborer, the culmination of whose toil, though begun
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off the premises, resulted in the delivery of the
casing where it should play its part necessary for
constructing and operating the machinery or equipment for an oil well. * * *"
Also see Hays Drilling Co. v. Sartain, 108 Okla. 181, 235
Pac. 615, 617; Comm. Oil Corp. v. Lumpkin, 113 Okla. 158,
241 Pac. 137; Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla.
77, 249 Pac. 717; Osage Oil & Refinery Co. v. Gromley, 23
Okla. 186, 252 Pac. 37; Cont. Supply Co. v. George Grenan
Co., 140 Okla. 221, 282 Pac. 598, to the same effect.
The reasoning of the court in the Hightower case should
also apply under the Utah statute. The language of the
Utah statute is much broader than that used in the Oklahoma statute which applies only to those who perform
labor in constructing or putting together the machinery
used in drilling the well while the Utah statute applies to
anyone who does work for the development of the oil well.
Although there are relatively few cases that have considered the question of the lienability of work performed
in transporting drilling equipment, there are many that
have considered the question of whether transportation for
other purposes is a nenable item under statutes much more
restrictive than the Utah statute.
In Cashman v. R~sell, 33 Ariz. 451, 265 Pac. 606, the
plaintiff brought an action to establish and foreclose a
mechanic's lien on a mine and certain mining claims for
the value of work performed in transporting machinery
and supplies to the mine. The Arizona statute provided
in part that "all miners, laborers and others who may
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* * * in or upon any mine, or mining claim
* * * shall have a lien upon the same for such sums as

labor

are unpaid." The court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to a lien and in so doing stated that:

"* * * The object of our lien statute is to
prevent the owner of mines or mining claims from
obtaining the labor of miners, laborers and others
who may labor in the improvement of such mining
property, or in extracting ores therefrom, without
paying for such labor.
"These lien statutes are remedial in their nature and should receive a liberal construction to
the end that they may accomplish what they were
designed to do. 40 C. J. 51, § 11; Davis v. Mial, 86
N. J. Law, 167, 90 A. 315, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1028.
"In construing our statute, we cannot obtain
very much aid from the decisions of other courts
because of the great dissimilarity of the statutes
granting liens. However, even though the language
in the different statutes may vary, a reading of
them will satisfy one that they have the same general object and purpose. Our effort is to find out,
if possible, what laborers on mining properties the
Legislature intended to protect by lien. It is very
improbable that the Legislature intended to discriminate as between persons who labor for an individual or a corporation engaged in working and
developing mining property. It is hardly conceivable
that it should have provided that miners who work
in the mines and on them should be preferred as
against those who are bringing to them the supplies
necessary to prosecute their work, or those persons
who, while not actually on or in the mines, are doing
services without which the miners could not work or
the mines operate. It would seem to us that the legislative language should not be limited to persons
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who labor only on and in the mining premises, but
extended to all whose labor contributes directly and
immediately to the mining operations and without
which they could not very well be carried on. In
such view, the plaintiff is clearly entitled to a lien
for the hauling he did for the defendant, both to
the mines and from the mines, * * * "
The court in Fowler v. Pompelly, 25 Ky. L. R. 615, 76
S. W. 173, in construing a statute which provided:

"* * * 'A person who performs labor or
furnishes rna terial in the erection, altering or repairing a house * * * shall have a lien thereon,
and upon the land upon which the said improvement shall have been made.' * * *"
stated that:

"* * * It is conceded that the materialmen
who furnished these articles to appellants to haul
and the laborers and contractor who actually erected
the building, have liens for the material furnished
and the labor performed, yet it is claimed by the
appellee that these appellants, who performed labor
just as necessary to the erection of the buildings as
the person who furnished the material or the persons who nailed the lumber on the building, have
no lien. We canot agree to this construction of the
statute. In our opinion, under a proper construction
of the statute, they are just as much entitled to lien
for their services as any of the persons named."
The Idaho Supreme Court in construing a statute which
provided that:

"* * * 'Every person performing labor
upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the
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construction, alteration or repair of, any mining
claim, building, * * * or any other structure,
* * * has a lien upon the same for the work or
labor done. * * *' "
held in Hill v. Twin Falls, etc., 22 Idaho 274, 125 Pac. 204,
that a person who hauls cement from a railroad station to
the site of a dam is entitled to a lien for his labor. In so
holding, the court stated:
"So, in the present case the labor and services
of the respondents became a part of the construction
of the dam to the same extent as the labor of any
other individuals and gave the respondents the same
right to a lien. The respondents hauled cement to
the place of use for the purpose of use, and it was
accepted by the appellant and so used in the construction and as a part of the construction the same
as any other material or any other labor contributing
to the erection and improvement of said property.
* * * There certainly can be no reason why
any class or kind of labor, and it matters not what
it is, which is intended to aid and enhance the construction of any particular improvement, and is received and used in such improvement, should not be
and is not entitled to a lien upon such improved
property under the statute of this state. * * *"
It is clear that the language and reasoning applied by

the courts in the cases cited above under statutes much more
restrictive than the Utah statute should also apply in the
instant case. The 'courts that have refused to recognize
mechanics' liens for the value of work performed in transporting supplies and equipment used in improving property
have generally done so because of the wording of the par-
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ticular statute involved. Often the statutes are so worded
as to give liens only to those who are upon the premises
when the work is performed. However, even in these cases,
the courts have given those who transport equipment or
supplies liens under statutes that provide that only those
who perform labor upon the property shall have liens. See
McClain v. Hutton, 131 Cal. 132, 61 Pac. 273, 63 Pac. 182;
McKeen v. Hasetine, 46 Minn. 426, 49 N. W. 195; Hill v.
Newman, 38 Pa. 151, 80 An. D. 473. Where the courts have
been unable to find that transportation is labor performed
upon the property, because of the wording of the statute,
they have often recognized a lien for the value of transportation services under the theory that it is part of the cost
of materials furnished. Republic Nat. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 68 F. 2d 445; American Lia,..
bility Surety Co. v. Bluefield Supply Co., 70 F. 2d 187;
Fagan v. Brock Motor Co., (Mo.), 282 S. W. 135; Brace &
H. Mill Co. v. Burbank, 87 Wash. 356, 151 Pac. 803; Wisconsin Brick Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N. W.
1044.
(c)

Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is to be Construed Liberally to Effect Object of Statute.

Mechanics' liens were never recognized by the common
law and are in derogation thereof. 36 Am. Jur. 19, Mechanics' Liens, Section 3. The Utah statute provides that:
"The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has
no application to the statutes of this state. The
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting
the subjects to which they relate, and their provi-
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sions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects
of the statutes and to promote justice. * * *"
Section 68-3-2, U. C. A., 1953.
This is in accordance with the great weight of authority
which holds that mechanics' lien statutes are to be construed
liberally so as to effect the object of such statutes, which
is to permit a lien upon premises where the owner has
benefited by having the value of his property increased or
improved as a result of labor or services rendered, work
done, or materials furnished by another. It is based upon
the principal of unjust enrichment and is designed to protect those who enhance the value of property of another
and are not paid therefor. The statutes place the burden
upon the owner of the property who benefits from the improvements to insure that those who make his enrichment
~ossible are paid. To achieve this end, the mechanics'
lien statutes are often supplemented as in Utah by statutes
which require the owner to obtain a bond from the principal
contractor for the protection of those who perform labor,
render services, do work or furnish materials. If the owner
fails to comply with this provision, he can be held personally liable for the amount due in addition to the rights
which the claimant may acquire under the mechanics' lien
statute.
The Supreme Court of the United States in affirming
a Utah Territorial Supreme Court decison holding that a
superintendent of a mine was one who came within the
purview of the Utah mechanics' lien statute stated: "Statutes giving liens to laborers and mechanics for their work
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and labor are to be liberally construed." Mining Co.
Callins, 104 U. S. 176, affirming 2 Utah 219; Davis
Alvord, 94 U. S. 545.

v.
v.

In Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 Pac.
713, the Utah Supreme Court in construing the mechanics'
lien statute then in effect quoted with approval the following language from Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, Section 4:
"The doctrine upon which the lien is founded
is the consideration of natural justice, that a party
who has enhanced the value of property by incorporating therein his labor or materials shall have
a preferred claim on such property for the value
of his labor and materials."
(d)

Public Policy Favors the Granting of Mechanics' Liens to Persons Who Perform
Work Such as That Performed by Stanton.

Development of the vast oil and gas resources of the
western states depends upon continuous exploration and
drilling programs. The leasehold interests such as held by
Davis in the instant case are valueless unless wells can be
drilled on the property covered by the leases. This often
requires the drilling of wells in isolated locations, miles
from any road. This problem is exemplified by the instant
case where in order to reach the location it was necessary
to ford the San Juan River and travel over 42 miles on
unimproved roads. In such cases, before a well can be
drilled, it is necessary to bulldoze roads into the location
and prepare the site for the drilling rig. Due to the depth
which such wells must be drilled, the drilling equipment
is extremely heavy, some of the individual items which
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were transported in the instant case weighed as much as
40,300 pounds. It must be remembered that often in order
to reach the location it is necessary to traverse almost impossible terrain as any one who is familiar with the southeastern portion of the State of Utah can well imagine.
After the drilling rig and other equipment are transported
to the site, it is necessary to erect the rigs. During the
drilling of the well, drill pipe, collars, casing, mud and innumerable other items of drilling equipment and supplies
must be transported to the well site. In drilling an oil well
it is necessary to use tremendous amounts of water. Often
the drilling location is located miles from the nearest water
supply and it is necessary to truck water to the location.
In many cases, this involves round-the-clock operations.
Specially designed trucks are used to make electrical logs
of the wells, run cement and perform other operations
which are absolutely essential to modern drilling methods.
Is it possible to say that any of the forms of transportation noted above is not work performed for the development of an oil well? Is it equitable to say that one should
be entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of his work
while another should not? Should the merchant who sells
supplies and transports them to the rig be allowed to include the cost of transportation and obtain a lien therefor
while the person who trucks water to the site be prevented
from obtaining a lien? Should the person who transports
the casing which becomes an integral part of the well be
entitled to lien for the value of his work while he transports
the drill pipe which is just as essential in the development
of a well be prevented from obtaining a lien? Should those
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who have specially designed trucks which are used to run
cement or log a well be entitled to include the cost of driving
the truck to the weBsite as a part of their services and be entitled to a lien while he who transports the very drilling
rig without which there would be no well be prevented
from obtaining a lien?
The answer to all of these questions is obviously no.
The legislatures of the various states have long recognized
the principle that one who has been enriched by having
the value of his property increased through the work, labor,
other services or materials furnished by a third party
should be responsible for seeing that said persons are paid.
It is for this reason that mechanics' lien statutes and statutes which require property owners to obtain bonds from
principal contractors protecting such persons or become
personally liable have been enacted.
The Utah legislature enacted legislation as early as
1890 which gave a lien to those whose labor or materials
increased the value of the property of another. Thereby
recognizing the principle that the property owner who is
enriched as a result of the labor of another should be the
one who is primarily responsible for seeing that the one
who made his enrichment possible is paid. The first Utah
statutes gave liens only to those who were upon the premises· when the labor was performed. In 1933 the legislature recognized that in the development of oil wells, mines
and other related activities it was necessary to have much
work which was not actually performed upon the premises
but without which such development would be impossible.
There was no reason why the person whose work though
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begun off the premises, was nevertheless absolutely essential for the development of such improvements as oil wells
and mines should not receive the same protection as the
person whose labor was actually performed on the premises.
It was. for this reason that the legislature provided that
all persons who do work for the development of an oil well
shall be entitled to a lien upon the property concerning
which their work was directed.

CONCLUSION
Stanton Transportation Company performed work in
transporting drilling equipment to a well site located on
property covered by an oil and gas lease owned by Davis
Oil Company. This equipment was used to drill a producing oil well upon said premises. Without the work performed by Stanton, it would have been impossible to develop an oil well on this location. The Utah mechanics' lien
statute gives a lien to all persons who do work for the development of oil wells upon the property concerning which
their work is directed. The only purpose of the work perf~rmed by Stanton was to develop an oil well on the subject
premises.
Public policy has long demanded that the property
owner who is enriched as a result of the labor performed
or materials furnished by another should be the one primarily responsible for seeing that the one who performs
such services is paid. Courts in other jurisdictions have
recognized transportation as a lienable item under statutes,
the coverage of which is much more narrow than that
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given by the Utah statute. The language of the Utah statute is extremely broad and its legislative history indicates
clearly that persons such as Stanton who perform work
for the development of an oil well should be entitled to a
lien for the value of the work performed.
For the reasons cited above, we submit that the trial
court was in error in ruling that Stanton was not entitled
to a lien for the value of the work it performed.
Respectfully submitted,
STERLING D. COLTON,
For Van Cott, Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy,
ALVIN J. MEIKLEJOHN, JR.,
Of Counsel,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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